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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the commonly explicated theory that democracy is a moderating 
force on the public’s support for terrorism. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that living in 
a democracy will decrease support for terror in Muslim populations. I analyze survey data 
on support for terrorism from the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which has data 
from 10 nations. I use an ordered logistic regression model to test what determines 
support for terrorism. The results show that democracy negatively correlates with support 
for terror. Additionally, I find that opinions toward US policy in the region, including the 
‘Global War on Terror’ and US support for Israel, do not correlate with support for 
terrorism. The results inform our understanding of why certain members of Muslim 
society that do not engage in acts of violence against civilians in defense of Islam support 
terror none-the-less.   
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The majority of Muslims around the world do not support terrorism. However, 
there are many that do, and the consequences of that support have touched the lives of 
individuals around the globe. The number of Muslims who support terror is not miniscule 
or simply a ‘fringe’ group; in fact according to a 2006 study conducted by the Pew 
Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project* 12.8 percent of total Muslim 
respondents† living in countries defined by the 2006 Economist Democracy Index to be 
“full” or at least “flawed democracies” indicated that they sometimes or often support an 
act of terror in defense of Islam.1 Additionally, more than double that number, 26.8 
percent, of respondents in nations defined by the Economist’s index as “hybrid” or 
“authoritarian” regimes stated that they sometimes or often support terror in defense of 
Islam.2 None-the-less, Western leaders around the globe mistakenly downplay the level 
of support for terror in the Islamic world.3 The reality is that Islamic extremism –more 
properly described as radical and violent fundamentalist Islam- is an ideology with many 
millions of followers, not the avoidable, manageable or containable beliefs of a few 
committed individuals.4 
Table 1.1 Countries in Study 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*Requested Disclaimer:  The Pew Global Attitudes “Project bears no responsibility for the interpretations 
presented or conclusions reached based on analysis of [their] data.” 
† This includes all respondents from countries in the survey, not just those ultimately included in the model 
as some respondents were dropped by the statistical program used during the regression as they declined to 
answer certain questions. 
1. Egypt  6. Nigeria  
2. France  7. Pakistan 
3. Germany 8. Spain 
4. Indonesia 9. Turkey 
5. Jordan  10. United Kingdom 
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A great deal of research has been conducted in an attempt to understand the 
political psychology of the fundamentalist Muslim suicide bomber. The literature on the 
subject has essentially rejected the widely held assertion that there is a causal connection 
between poverty and low education, and engaging in acts of terror.5 Further, the West can 
not pass off fundamentalist Muslim suicide bombers as simply crazed radicals.6  
For a variety of reasons, the primary focus of Western research in this field has 
been on the bomber him or herself. However, fundamentalist Muslim terrorism is not an 
individual aberration.  This strain of terror would not exist in such numbers and would 
not have such sophisticated capabilities7 if there did not exist populations from which 
terror organizations could operate.8  
Authoritarian states that do not posses the power or the inclination to oppose 
terrorism are prime headquarters for terrorists.9 The very nature of these authoritarian 
regimes causes the governments in question to be viewed by their people as corrupt and 
stifles the free-thinking discourse that would be associated with the moderation of violent 
religious doctrine. Religion is often a philosophical rallying point for perceived 
governmental injustice. This fact, combined with a religious doctrine that has not had the 
room to modernize (also stemming from the authoritarian nature of the government in 
question) causes great swathes of the societies in question to support terrorism – in 
particular in the Middle East. Thus, there is a great value in conducting research beyond 
the motivations and the psychology of the individual terrorist, and examining what causes 
non-terrorist members of Muslim society to support acts of terror in defense of Islam. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
An act of terror can be broadly defined as an act of ideologically motivated 
violence against a target intended to both inflict physical damage on person and/or 
property and inflict a psychological trauma upon the wider target society. More narrowly, 
within this paper the terrorism in question is limited to an act of such violence against 
civilians in defense of Islam. 
There are essentially two broad schools of thought regarding the motivation for 
support for terrorism: Western Middle Eastern policy –in particular long-standing support 
for Israel and/or the Bush Administration’s War on Terror- is responsible for street level 
support for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, or this support can be attributed to 
indigenous factors.  
The foremost purveyors of the hypothesis that Western policy is at least in part 
responsible for Muslim support for terror in the name of Islam are Dr.’s Stephen Walt 
and John Mearshimer who assert “unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier 
for extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits.”10  
Though he makes clear that his theories do not hold for all terrorism, but rather 
only acts of suicide terrorism, the extension of Robert Pape’s 200511 argument would also 
essentially argue that U.S. policy in the Middle East is largely responsible for support for 
Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately Pape’s discussion suffers from a fundamental logical 
misstep that calls into question the validity of his central theoretical conclusion. As a 
foundation for his argument Pape categorizes terrorism as “demonstrative,” “destructive” 
and “suicide” terrorism.12 This delineation is inconsistent as the first two categories 
define terror based on tangible goals whereas the third defines terror based upon tactic 
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(and falls into the definition of destructive terrorism). Empirical evidence extrapolated 
using this inconsistent delineation serves as the foundation for Pape’s ultimate assertion 
that terror organizations that use suicide bombers are motivated by the desire to free land 
of foreign occupation, and specifically in the case of Middle Eastern terror organizations, 
are offended by the presence of foreign troops in historically Muslim lands. 
While I concur with Pape’s assertion that the leaders of Islamic terror 
organizations certainly want to rid the Middle East of any foreign troop (and I would add 
liberal democratic or secular political) presence, I argue that the terrorists in question and 
their autocratic backers (as well as a portion of their individual supporters) have a wider 
more imperialist agenda.13  The consequence of the illogical way in which Pape classifies 
terror, coupled with his not giving proper weight to the stated ideological motivations of 
the subjects he studies, leads to a fundamentally flawed and oversimplified understanding 
of Islamic terrorism, thus raising serious doubts about Pape’s “New Strategy for 
Victory.”  
As was previously noted, Pape would likely reject the application of his theory to 
general support for terror in the name of Islam, but none-the-less, the logical extension of 
his argument should be addressed and ultimately falls within the theory that modern 
Western Middle East policy is largely responsible for the alarmingly high level of support 
for fundamentalist Islamic terrorism.  
The other school of thought is the theory that low education and poverty drive 
participation in terrorist activity. As was previously cited the literature has largely 
rejected this assertion. However, beyond education and poverty, there are certainly other 
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indigenous factors that could contribute to support for terror in the name of Islam, namely 
democracy, or a lack thereof. 
3 THEORY 
Even the most cursory review of history shows that religious supremacy and 
conversion at the point of the sword are not uniquely Islamic phenomena. An honest 
review of the sacred texts of the Abrahamic faiths should lead one to conclude that within 
the Torah, the Christian Bible and the Koran one could certainly find statements that 
could be interpreted as advocating violent archaic law or religious imperialism. However 
the Koran has several overt statements inciting followers to engage in violent acts in the 
name of religious supremacy.14 That Bin Laden and his philosophical kin can find a 
Koranic basis for the violence they perpetrate cannot be disputed, but the Koran is not 
alone in containing passages that some might find violent or disturbing.   
It is not the doctrines of faith that are responsible for such great support for 
terrorism in the Islamic world – though such doctrines certainly play a role- but rather the 
nature of the governments in which the individuals of said faith live. To be sure, the 
Koran does contain violent doctrine, but I posit that where democracy is present the 
interpretation and implementation of this theology is much more likely to be subjected to 
a modern ethical filter. 
I argue that certain interpretations of the violent imperial religious doctrines in 
Islam cause some individuals to feel compelled to support conflict, despite a natural 
ethical15 and justifiably self-interested16 aversion to violence. Support for religiously 
motivated violence against civilians (in this case Islamic terrorism) would be minimized 
largely through the moderation of the interpretation of the violent religious doctrines 
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associated with the motivating theology. Democracy enables that moderation through 
deliberation, because deliberation promotes tolerance. 
Thus tolerance is the primary causal mechanism through which deliberation 
moderates the theological philosophy that serves as the basis of support for terror.17 There 
exists in the political science literature a fairly well accepted linkage between deliberation 
and tolerance. Most succinctly Delli Carpini et al. (2002) note that “[public] exchanges 
are a central way of clarifying and negotiating deep divisions over material interests and 
moral values.”18  Citing Warren (1996)19 as well as Guttman and Thompson (1996)20, 
Burkhalter et al. (2002) explain the linkage: “because deliberation leads citizens to 
consider the arguments of other citizens it should produce increased understanding and 
tolerance of the variety of perspectives on the common good.”21  In addition, Gastil 
(2002) concurs with Mendleberg (2002)22 when the former notes that deliberation 
increases tolerance and causes individuals to “examine a problem and arrive at a well 
reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of 
view.”23  
The connection between deliberation and tolerance is neither novel nor terribly 
controversial. Though many of the above cited works examine deliberation as a tool for 
improving democracy (largely concentrating on Western populations), one should expect 
that the power of deliberation to increase tolerance would extend directly to arguments 
contrasting the views of individuals in democratic states with those living under 
authoritarian regimes, because it is assumed that there are much greater levels of 
deliberation in democratic states than in authoritarian nations. This should not be 
confused with an argument asserting that there exists a nation that has achieved a pure 
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deliberative democracy; however if Page is correct and “[p]ublic deliberation is essential 
to democracy,”24 than it stands to reason that long standing democracies do in fact have 
high levels of public deliberation. While we must accept that deliberative democracy will 
not be complete,25 the logical extension of this argument is that one could reasonably 
assume that the more democratic a state (in its totality), the greater the level and quality 
of deliberation.  
  In sum, the theory explicated here is that democracy moderates those violent 
imperialist interpretations of Islamic doctrine that serve as the philosophical foundation 
for Islamic terrorism. That moderation occurs because in democracies there exist much 
higher levels of deliberation, and the primary consequence of deliberation is the spread of 
tolerance.  
4 HYPOTHESIS  
I will test this theory through the following hypothesis: 
H1: There will be a negative correlation between support for Islamic terrorism 
and the level of democracy in the country in which the respondent lives. 
If democracy does have a moderating effect on violent religious supremacy 
(specifically in this case Islamic supremacy) we should see a negative correlation 
between support for terror and the level of democracy in the country in which the 
respondent resides.  
5 DATA 
I use data from the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes survey “The Great Divide: How 
Westerners and Muslims View Each Other.”26 The model consists of responses from 
8 
5,335 Muslim individuals in ten countries across Europe, Asia and Africa (including of 
course the Middle East). 
The dependent variable is “Support for Terror.” This variable is operationalized 
by coding responses to a question in the Pew survey, which asked if respondents felt that 
“suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets… [are] often 
justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?” In the 
primary model, responses are coded in ascending order of frequency of justification.  In 
order to address Mondak and Sanders 2003 assertion that degrees of tolerance are not as 
starkly different from one another as simply whether or not one posses any intolerant 
positions, in the second model, the dependent variable is dichotomously coded, with 
terror rarely and never justified set against terror sometimes and often justified.27   
The independent variable of primary interest, “Democracy,” is operationalized by 
using the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index scores from the year of the 
survey (2006).28 The decision to use the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
and not another more traditional academic rating of democracy or freedom is rooted in 
the theoretical underpinnings of this paper. The Economist’s researchers quite 
conclusively explain that the traditional measures of democracy are quite “thin.”29 I 
concur with the Economist’s assertion that the more traditional indices “do not 
encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy 
is or its quality.”30 None-the-less Freedom House scores are also used as a measure of 
freedom in order to test the robustness of the theory (in so far as democracy and freedom 
are so closely related). The results of this test (discussed below) are found to be very 
similar and lend further support to the theory. 
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The two other independent variables of secondary interest are “Support for the US 
War on Terror” and “Sympathy for the Palestinians” (or Israelis), as they directly relate 
to the aforementioned competing theories on the subject of what correlates with support 
for terror. The former variable is operationalized through a four point ordinal scale (0-3) 
at which the higher number indicates greater support for the “US led War on Terror” and 
the lower number indicates opposition. “Sympathy for the Palestinians,” as opposed to 
the Israelis, is operationalized through a three point ordinal variable with sympathy for 
Israel receiving a one, sympathy for Palestinians receiving a three, and sympathy for 
neither or both receiving a two.  
Several control variables are included in order to account for demographic and 
socioeconomic factors. Education is indexed on an eight point scale in an attempt to 
create a general education index for all individuals around the world.  
Due to a wide variance in costs of living across the countries examined, absolute 
income is not an accurate assessment of a respondent’s status. Additionally, because the 
number and scope of income brackets varies a great deal across countries in the data, a 
relative income scale is created, wherein a respondent’s income bracket is recoded on a 
scale of zero to one, relative to the income breakdown of the other respondent’s in the 
country in question. This allows for uniformity across borders and more accurately 
describes the wealth of the individual relative to his/her nation’s cost of living.  
Age and gender are both included as they may impact attitudes towards terrorism. 
A six point ordinal scale measuring the frequency of mosque attendance is included in 
order to account for religiosity.  
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Finally in order to control for social desirability factors, specifically to in part 
measure the impact living in a non-majority Muslim country may have upon the 
respondents, I include a variable measuring the percentage of Muslims of the 
population31 of the country in which the respondent lives.‡  
Mondak and Sanders32 offer a more standard measure of social desirability when 
examining such contentious topics. Largely relying on their model, figure one shows that 
response rates relating to support for terror are higher than other questions on the survey. 
In total 95% of individuals answered the question relating to support for terror. The 
lowest level of response for any question was a 90% response rate to the question 
regarding income (often seen in survey research). Further, more individuals in non-
authoritarian states (97%) responded to the support for terror question, where as 94% of 
individuals responded to the support for terror question in authoritarian states. Finally, as 
will be reported in more detail in following sections, the variable measuring the percent 
of the population that is Muslim -while significant- is in small measure negatively 
correlated with support for terror. 
Given the above information, if any conclusion regarding social desirability is to 
be drawn, it is that true to theory of the paper, those living in democracies feel freer to 
answer contentious questions. Because regimes like Egypt and Jordan are opposed to 
organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood a respondent might feel that responding 
honestly to such a question (if they do in fact support terror) is perilous. At worst, 
                                                 
‡ The 2006 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom is used for religious demography. 
However, in Nigeria the 2008 CIA World Fact Book is used as the most recent Nigerian census numbers 
had been disputed. Further Spain does not allow state census efforts to gather figures on faith, as such an 
estimate from the aforementioned State Department Report is used. Finally, as the State Department 
Report’s information on France gives a range, the mean of that range is used.  
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tyranny-induced social desirability depresses articulated support for terror in totalitarian 
states. The summary statistics are reported in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5.2 Response Rates 
 
6 METHODS 
The primary model uses an ordered logistic regression with the ordinal dependent 
variable support for terror, and all other variables operationalized as discussed above. The 
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secondary model similarly uses an ordered logistic regression, but measures support for 
terror, through a dichotomous dummy variable.  
In addition to these two primary models, a multinomial probit regression is run to 
test the robustness of the conclusions, measuring the impact of democracy on each level 
of support for terror (and their relationship to one another) with the response “never” 
serving as the base outcome. Finally, an ordered logistic regression, in which the ordinal 
variable democracy is transformed into a categorical variable as per the levels of 
democracy delineated by the Economist Democracy Index, is run to test the whether or 
not democracy’s moderating effect has a threshold over which the effect can be shown. 
Here the omitted category is Authoritarian Regime.  
In all models, variables are clustered around country, and sample weights are 
included.§33 
7 FINDINGS 
The findings support the theory. The hypothesis holds in both models as there is a 
strong negative and statistically significant correlation (at the >.0001 level) between the 
level of democracy in the respondent’s home country and support for terror against 
civilians in defense of Islam. Neither of the secondary independent variables of interest 
(Opposition to the US War on Terror or Sympathy for the Palestinians**) showed 
                                                 
§ Weights do not drastically impact results. The primary variable of interest retains highly similar levels of 
significance across tests when tests are run without weights. This said, in the ordinal test using Freedom 
House scores rather than Democracy Index scores as a measure of freedom/democracy, Mosque 
Attendance (.05) and Age (.10) were found to be significant, the Percentage of the Population that was 
Muslim was found to be in significant and the impact of democracy was found to be slightly less 
significant. Overall, regardless of weighting, the results would lead largely to the same conclusions. Non-
weighted results are available upon request.  
** For those that may be concerned that a lack of variance in these variables led to an outcome indicating 
that these two variables do not have any explanatory effect, please refer to the summary in figure two 
which shows – through the means and standard deviations – that there is a reasonable amount of variance in 
both variables. 
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statistical significance, thus calling into question those theories that assert that the US led 
War on Terror or US support for Israel has a measurable and significant impact on 
support for terror in defense of Islam.  
In both the ordinal model and in the model in which the dependent variable was 
coded dichotomously, the Chi-Squared is reported at 0.0000, lending support to the 
models’ fit. 
As was previously noted, the percent of the country that is Muslim is significantly 
and negatively correlated with support for terror (at the >.0001 level). However, as noted 
below, using the program Clarify, I find that the results indicate that the level of 
democracy is a considerably more important factor when examining support for terror, 
than the country’s percentage of Muslim population. This said, this variable does remain 
an important element of our above discussion concerning social desirability.  
The multinomial probit regression largely mimics the results of the primary 
models, with both independent variables of significance increasing in significance as the 
level of democracy in which the respondent lives decreases. Further, the ordered logistic 
regression in which the ordinal variable democracy is transformed into a categorical 
variable also sees similar levels of significance across the variables relating to democracy 
and Muslim percentage of the population of the country in which the respondent lives. 
Notably, democracy becomes insignificant once the country in question becomes a hybrid 
regime (the omitted category is Authoritarian Regimes), thus one can conclude that at a 
certain point a regime becomes so repressive that variance in democracy no longer has a 
moderating impact on violent religious doctrine. In both secondary models the secondary 
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independent variables of interest remain insignificant. The full results of these secondary 
models are available upon request.  
Table 7.1 Determinants of Support for Terror  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As noted above, in order to test the robustness of the findings, the primary and 
secondary models are run using Freedom House scores,†† rather than Economist 
Democracy Index scores as the primary independent variable of interest. In the ordinal 
test, the independent variable of interest Freedom reports a P-Value of .051 with a 
coefficient of -.28. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance 
of .01 and reports a coefficient of -.018. ‡‡  In the dichotomous test, Freedom reports a P-
                                                 
†† Freedom scores were determined by taking the mean of the 2006 Freedom House political rights and 
civil liberties scores.  
‡‡ Though outcomes using Polity IV scores do similarly correlate directionally with Democracy Index and 
Freedom House scores (i..e. Democracy is negatively correlated with support for terror) the results are not 
statistically significant at .05 level: P-Value of .13 for ordinal regression, .085 for dichotomous.  The only 
   Ordinal   Dichotomous                      
Democracy  -.39***   -.43*** 
   (.10)    (.09) 
Religiosity  .02    -.002 
   (.03)    (.04) 
Income  -.18    -.6 
   (.45)    (.48) 
Age   -.003    .008* 
   (.004)    (.004) 
Gender  -.013    -.07 
   (.16)    (.2) 
Education  .012    .02 
   (.04)    (.04) 
Sup. US WOT  -.09    -.04 
   (.14)    (.19) 
Pal. Symp.  -.01    -.17 
   (.13)    (.15) 
Country Perc. Mus. -.01***   -.015*** 
   (.003)    (.003) 
 
Ordered logistic regression reporting robust standard errors, clustered on country. *** Indicates significance at the 
>.0001 level. * Indicates significance at the >.05 level. For both models: N= 5,335 and Chi-Squared = .0000
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Value of .02 with a coefficient of -.31 while the population that is Muslim retains its .009 
P-Value with a coefficient of -.02. Thus as previously indicated, the substitution of 
Freedom House§§ scores for Economist Democracy Index scores does not drastically 
impact the theoretical conclusions of the paper. Further, I would argue that the (all-be-it 
minimal) relative change in the explanatory power of democracy/freedom, is an 
indication that the Economist scores are simply a better measure of the intangible 
democracy that I seek to measure in this paper. Freedom House makes no claim to 
measure democracy, but rather, seeks to measure “political rights and civil liberties,” 
which while vital to the existence of democracy, do not in-and-of-themselves constitute 
the full measure of democracy.  
 It should also be noted that in both regressions in which the variable measuring 
support for terror is dichotomous, age is found to be moderately significant and positively 
correlated with support for terror.***  
In order to further test the robustness of the conclusions, two factor analyses were 
run and the scores they deliver are tested in new models. First, I run a principle 
component analyses on the five differing scores††† that make up the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index scores from the year of the survey (2006).34 The 
resulting primary component reports an Eigen value of 3.77. The principal component’s 
Eigen Vectors show that the primary component loads about equally on all five elements 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable significant at the .05 level is the percentage of the population that is Muslim, which is negatively 
correlated with support for terror at similar levels exhibited by the Economist and Freedom House scores in 
both ordinal and dichotomous models. The P Values for this variable was .041 in both models. 
§§ Results of Freedom House tests are available in Appendix A. 
*** The regression using Polity IV scores with the dichotomous measure of support for terror as the 
dependent variable reports age to also be positively correlated with terror, with a P-Value of .066. 
††† The five elements defined by the Economist Democracy Index are 1 electoral participation, 2 the 
functioning of government, 3 political participation, 4 political culture, and 5 civil liberties. 
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of the Democracy index score;‡‡‡ the highest being .5 associated with civil liberties and 
the lowest being .36 associated with political culture. All others load in the .4 to .5 range. 
This component is used to predict the first new measure of democracy which captures the 
essence of the democratic concept.  
Using this essence of democracy in place of the Economist’s original number, the 
new model confirms the conclusions of the first: When support for terror is measured 
ordinaly, democracy’s essence reports a coefficient of -.38 and with a P Value of >.0001. 
The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of >.0001 and 
reports a coefficient of -.014.§§§ All other variables are insignificant. When I use the 
dichotomous measure of support for terror democracy’s essence reports a coefficient of -
.4 and with a P Value of >.0001. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports 
significance of >.0001 and retains a coefficient of just -.014.**** As with the other 
dichotomous models, age is again significant and positively correlated with support for 
terror, reporting a P-value of .036 and a coefficient of .008. All other variables are 
insignificant. 
The second factor analysis is run using the scores from each of the three measures 
of democracy (from 2006) noted in this paper: Economist Democracy Index, Freedom 
House, Polity IV Project. The resulting primary component reports an Eigen value of 
2.85. The principal component’s Eigen Vectors report that the primary component loads 
about equally on all three scores the highest being .59 associated with Freedom House 
and the lowest being .57 associated with the Economist.  
                                                 
‡‡‡ The full results of the factor analysis including the principal components (Eigen Vectors) are available 
in Appendix B. 
§§§ Full Results available in Appendix C 
**** Full Results available in Appendix C 
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Using this combined measure of democracy in place of the Economist’s original 
number, the new model confirms the conclusions of the first: When I use the ordinal 
measure of support for terror the combined measure of democracy reports a coefficient of 
-.32 and with a P Value of .03. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports 
significance of .004 and reports a coefficient of -.017.†††† All other variables are 
insignificant. When I use the dichotomous measure of support for terror, the combined 
measure of democracy reports a coefficient of -.34 and with a P Value of .013. The 
percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of .006 and retains a 
coefficient of just -.019.‡‡‡‡ As with the other dichotomous models, age is again 
significant and positively correlated with support for terror, reporting a P-value of .049 
and a coefficient of .007. All other variables are insignificant. 
In order to gauge the substantive impact of the democracy variable (in the 
dichotomous model)§§§§, I use the software Clarify to show the predicted probability of 
support for terror in populations that are one standard deviation above and below the 
mean in the democracy score, while holding the other independent variables constant at 
their mean. The findings indicate that there is a higher probability of support for terror in 
a country with a democracy score one standard deviation below the mean at 
approximately 36 percent; where as in a country with a democracy score one standard 
deviation above the mean the probability of support for terror is 11 percent, while holding 
all else constant. These results are significant with a 95% confidence interval.  These 
                                                 
†††† Full Results available in Appendix C 
‡‡‡‡ Full Results available in Appendix C 
§§§§ Though substantively it had no impact, it should be noted that weights were not used to determine the 
coefficients in the model tested, as STATA does not properly execute the Clarify command when weights 
are included. 
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results show a large substantive impact in democracy’s moderating effect on support for 
terror.  
As previously noted I also used Clarify to show the show the predicted probability 
of support for terror in populations that are one standard deviation above and below the 
mean in the percentage of the population that is Muslim. The findings show that there is a 
lower probability of support for terror in a country with a higher percentage of the 
population that is Muslim.  The predicted probability of support for terror in a country 
with a 100 percent Muslim population was approximately 14 percent; while the predicted 
probability of support for terror in a country with one standard deviation below the mean 
was approximately 20 percent. This said, as is shown in Figure 4, there is substantial 
overlap in predicted probabilities within the 95 percent confidence interval, thus one 
should not read too much into the substantive impact of these findings. In spite of the fact 
that Islamic community homogeneity decreases the probability of support for terror, top 
line support for terror remains exponentially higher in majority Muslim countries because 
of the authoritarianism found there. In other words, democracy (or a lack there of) is of 
much greater consequence than Islamic community homogeneity when attempting to 
predict support for terror. 
19 
Figure 7.2 The Impact of Living in a Democracy on Support for Terror 
 
Figure 7.3 The Impact of Islamic Population Homogeneity on Support for Terror 
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8 DISCUSSION 
Democracy has been shown to have a moderating effect on violent Islamic 
religious supremacy. Neither support or sympathy for the Palestinians nor opposition to 
the US led War on Terror is correlated with support for Islamic terrorism in any model, 
thus when the scientific method is applied through individual level quantitative analysis, 
those assertions linking these two Western policies to support for terrorism in the Middle 
East are shown to be lacking validity.  
The policy implications for the West are clear. The Western foreign policy of 
avoiding democratic elections where Islamists are likely to win35 or propping up 
tyrannical regimes when expedient is partially to blame for these regimes remaining in 
power. And this lack of democracy stifles religious moderation.*****  
Western policy makers and pundits have long feared that Islamic democracy 
would lead to democratically elected “Islamist governments unwilling to cooperate with 
[the US].”36 However, this policy ignores the evidence presented in this paper, incorrectly 
assumes majority support for Islamic terror across the Middle East, and ignores the fact 
that regardless of whether or not the country in question has a majority Muslim 
population, tangible government support for terror is highly depressed in truly democratic 
states (relative to authoritarian regimes). Given that democracy moderates support for 
violent religious doctrine and given that in Iraq we have not seen that government support 
                                                 
***** I would note that a limitation of this research is that it is unknown if the theory of this paper would 
extend directly to the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Though we certainly see much less support 
for terror amongst Arabs living in Israel proper than those living in Palestinian Authority or Hamas 
controlled territories, a great deal of specific and additional research would need to be conducted in order to 
understand the impact of this specific conflict and the associated institutional/religiously oriented 
Palestinian incitement of violence.22a  
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terror as its predecessor did††††† one should conclude that over the long-term the Western 
policy that must be corrected is support for tyranny in the Middle East. 
To be clear, the data here does not draw conclusions as to the methods for 
bringing democracy to the Middle East. Though arguments could be made that this 
research indicates that because democracy does moderate violent religious extremism, 
democracy through external violent intervention -i.e. the U.S. invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan- is a prudent policy, such an argument is an oversimplification of the issue. 
The host of literature discussing the best policies for bringing democracy to tyrannical 
regimes is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Ultimately, foreign policy realists and pacifists have long preferred détente over 
aggressive diplomatic (or military) confrontation even though this has been shown to be a 
strategic error. The West should not ignore the moral hazard of promoting tyranny in the 
name of stability, but nor should we act as if promoting democracy is strictly a moral 
endeavor. Encouraging democratic proliferation has a long-term strategic benefit too 
often ignored by policy elites.  
In the final analysis there exists some truth to both schools of thought on this 
subject. An indigenous factor does impact support for terror in the Middle East, but the 
factor is democracy, not education or poverty. Further, Western policies in the Middle 
East also impact support for terror in the region, but it is not US support for Israel or the 
US led War on Terror, but rather the policy of pursuing détente with autocratic regimes 
and failing to demand they implement democratic reforms that is flawed.  
 
                                                 
††††† This is a reference to the Hussein regime’s support for Palestinian terrorists. 22b 
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10 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Freedom’s Impact on Support for Terror 
 
Table 10.1 Determinants of Support for Terror 
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Appendix B: Principle Component Analyses 
 
Table 10.2 Principle Component Analysis of Economist Democracy Score 
 
 Principal components/correlation                    Number of obs      =   7146 
                                                    Number of comp.  =         5 
                         Trace                   =         5 
  Rotation: (unrotated = principal)               Rho                        =    1.0000 
 
Component |   Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative 
       Comp1 |      3.77812      3.05584             0.7556       0.7556 
       Comp2 |      .722282      .296838             0.1445       0.9001 
       Comp3 |      .425444      .368956             0.0851       0.9852 
       Comp4 |     .0564884     .0388273           0.0113       0.9965 
       Comp5 |     .0176611            .                  0.0035       1.0000 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
Variable           Comp1      Comp2      Comp3         Comp4        Comp5    Unexplained  
electoralp~s      0.4860      -0.3487      -0.1370        -0.1578         0.7737              0  
govtfuncti~g     0.4635      -0.4388        0.2298         0.6649       -0.3126              0  
polpartici~n      0.4061        0.3902      -0.7891         0.1594       -0.1864              0  
politicalc~e       0.3649        0.7237       0.5232         0.1455        0.2193              0  
civilliberty         0.5009      -0.0993       0.1788       -0.6975       -0.4699              0   
 
Table 10.3 Principle Component Analysis of Combined Measures of Democracy 
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 Appendix C: Additional Tests 
 
Table 10.4 Determinants of Support for Terror 
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Table 10.5 Determinants of Support for Terror 
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 Appendix D: Summary Statistics by Country 
 
Table 10.6 Egypt 
 
democracya~d         936   -1.746585           0  -1.746585  -1.746585
  demessence         936   -1.651893           0  -1.651893  -1.651893
                                                                      
    internet         907    .1444322    .3517214          0          1
  fhcivillib         936           5           0          5          5
civilliberty         936        3.53           0       3.53       3.53
politicalc~e         936        6.88           0       6.88       6.88
polpartici~n         936        2.78           0       2.78       2.78
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         936        3.64           0       3.64       3.64
electoralp~s         936        2.67           0       2.67       2.67
  polity2006         936          -3           0         -3         -3
     freedom         936         2.5           0        2.5        2.5
religion2006         936          90           0         90         90
                                                                      
supterrord~y         910    .2846154    .4514792          0          1
    DemFours         936           4           0          4          4
   DemThrees         936           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         936           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         936           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d         936           4           0          4          4
       often         910    .0835165    .2768134          0          1
   sometimes         910    .2010989    .4010422          0          1
      rarley         910    .2549451      .43607          0          1
  ordpalsymp         935    2.954011    .2757556          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         936           1           0          1          1
    supuswot         864    .1018519    .3026286          0          1
educationi~d         936    2.519231    2.145423          0          7
         sex         936    1.503205     .500257          1          2
         age         936    36.58654    12.19954         18         62
                                                                      
   relincome         936    .4557692    .2340274         .2          1
   democracy         936         3.9           0        3.9        3.9
realmosque~t         930    3.506452    1.858985          1          6
   supterror         910    .9076923    .9940672          0          3
     country         936           3           0          3          3
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Egypt
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Table 10.7 France 
 
democracya~d         400    2.261921           0   2.261921   2.261921
  demessence         400    2.772264           0   2.772264   2.772264
                                                                      
    internet         400         .73    .4445154          0          1
  fhcivillib         400           1           0          1          1
civilliberty         400        9.12           0       9.12       9.12
politicalc~e         400         7.5           0        7.5        7.5
polpartici~n         400        6.67           0       6.67       6.67
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         400         7.5           0        7.5        7.5
electoralp~s         400        9.58           0       9.58       9.58
  polity2006         400           9           0          9          9
     freedom         400           7           0          7          7
religion2006         400           9           0          9          9
                                                                      
supterrord~y         396    .1691919    .3753956          0          1
    DemFours         400           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees         400           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         400           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         400           1           0          1          1
                                                                      
countrydem~d         400           1           0          1          1
       often         396    .0656566    .2479941          0          1
   sometimes         396    .1035354    .3050422          0          1
      rarley         396    .1843434    .3882545          0          1
  ordpalsymp         393    2.722646    .5731413          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         400    .0775129    .0220896    .032944    .217332
    supuswot         397    .2141058    .4107182          0          1
educationi~d         400      4.4475    1.312078          0          6
         sex         400      1.5125    .5004697          1          2
         age         400       32.97    12.00623         18         80
                                                                      
   relincome         388    .4293078    .2033301   .1428571          1
   democracy         400        8.07           0       8.07       8.07
realmosque~t         398    2.497487    1.697158          1          6
   supterror         396    .5883838      .91942          0          3
     country         400           4           0          4          4
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = France
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Table 10.8 Germany 
 
 countryname           0
democracya~d         413    2.593892           0   2.593892   2.593892
  demessence         413    3.593344           0   3.593344   3.593344
                                                                      
    internet         409    .6405868    .4804161          0          1
  fhcivillib         413           1           0          1          1
civilliberty         413        9.41           0       9.41       9.41
politicalc~e         413        8.75           0       8.75       8.75
polpartici~n         413        7.78           0       7.78       7.78
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         413        8.57           0       8.57       8.57
electoralp~s         413        9.58           0       9.58       9.58
  polity2006         413          10           0         10         10
     freedom         413           7           0          7          7
religion2006         413           4           0          4          4
                                                                      
supterrord~y         401    .0798005    .2713226          0          1
    DemFours         413           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees         413           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         413           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         413           1           0          1          1
                                                                      
countrydem~d         413           1           0          1          1
       often         401    .0099751       .0995          0          1
   sometimes         401    .0698254     .255171          0          1
      rarley         401    .0523691    .2230485          0          1
  ordpalsymp         371    2.371968    .7509786          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         413    .0764407    .0551164    .010718    .303655
    supuswot         386    .3264249    .4695133          0          1
educationi~d         381    3.577428    .9275972          3          6
         sex         413    1.457627    .4988056          1          2
         age         413     37.0799    12.89788         18         97
                                                                      
   relincome         357    .4326175    .2129752   .1111111          1
   democracy         413        8.82           0       8.82       8.82
realmosque~t         405     3.05679     1.73754          1          6
   supterror         401    .2219451    .6108332          0          3
     country         413           5           0          5          5
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> countryname = Germany
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Table 10.9 Indonesia 
 
democracya~d         909    1.130877           0   1.130877   1.130877
  demessence         909    1.029474           0   1.029474   1.029474
                                                                      
    internet         892     .073991    .2619031          0          1
  fhcivillib         909           3           0          3          3
civilliberty         909        6.76           0       6.76       6.76
politicalc~e         909        6.25           0       6.25       6.25
polpartici~n         909           5           0          5          5
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         909        7.14           0       7.14       7.14
electoralp~s         909        6.92           0       6.92       6.92
  polity2006         909           8           0          8          8
     freedom         909         5.5           0        5.5        5.5
religion2006         909        88.2           0       88.2       88.2
                                                                      
supterrord~y         899    .1023359    .3032583          0          1
    DemFours         909           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees         909           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         909           2           0          2          2
     DemOnes         909           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d         909           2           0          2          2
       often         899    .0177976    .1322886          0          1
   sometimes         899    .0845384    .2783484          0          1
      rarley         899    .1779755    .3827051          0          1
  ordpalsymp         859    2.812573    .4356281          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         909    1.000089    .3498293      .2857     1.6803
    supuswot         875    .3908571    .4882215          0          1
educationi~d         909    3.342134    1.185725          0          6
         sex         909     1.49835    .5002725          1          2
         age         909    36.38064    11.81336         18         89
                                                                      
   relincome         907    .2546858    .1165474   .0833333          1
   democracy         909        6.41           0       6.41       6.41
realmosque~t         903    4.843854    1.510856          1          6
   supterror         899    .4004449     .718697          0          3
     country         909           7           0          7          7
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Indonesia
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Table 10.10 Jordan 
 
 CountryName           0
democracya~d         972   -1.301352           0  -1.301352  -1.301352
  demessence         972      -1.656           0     -1.656     -1.656
                                                                      
    internet         956    .2039749    .4031615          0          1
  fhcivillib         972           4           0          4          4
civilliberty         972        3.82           0       3.82       3.82
politicalc~e         972           5           0          5          5
polpartici~n         972        3.89           0       3.89       3.89
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         972        3.79           0       3.79       3.79
electoralp~s         972        3.08           0       3.08       3.08
  polity2006         972          -2           0         -2         -2
     freedom         972         3.5           0        3.5        3.5
religion2006         972          95           0         95         95
                                                                      
supterrord~y         967    .2885212    .4533092          0          1
    DemFours         972           4           0          4          4
   DemThrees         972           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         972           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         972           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d         972           4           0          4          4
       often         967    .0465357    .2107511          0          1
   sometimes         967    .2419855    .4285072          0          1
      rarley         967    .2781799    .4483344          0          1
  ordpalsymp         970    2.963918    .2265575          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         972           1           0          1          1
    supuswot         870    .1689655     .374937          0          1
educationi~d         971    2.416066    1.945629          0          6
         sex         972     1.48251    .4999513          1          2
         age         972    35.30453    13.18176         18         77
                                                                      
   relincome         952    .3257538    .1585696   .0588235   .8823529
   democracy         972        3.92           0       3.92       3.92
realmosque~t         962     3.75052     1.83733          1          6
   supterror         967     .901758    .9233945          0          3
     country         972           9           0          9          9
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Jordan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
Table 10.11 Nigeria 
 
democracya~d         468   -.6759991           0  -.6759991  -.6759991
  demessence         468   -2.133955           0  -2.133955  -2.133955
                                                                      
    internet         468    .1837607    .3877033          0          1
  fhcivillib         468           4           0          4          4
civilliberty         468        3.82           0       3.82       3.82
politicalc~e         468        4.38           0       4.38       4.38
polpartici~n         468        4.44           0       4.44       4.44
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         468        1.86           0       1.86       1.86
electoralp~s         468        3.08           0       3.08       3.08
  polity2006         468           4           0          4          4
     freedom         468           4           0          4          4
religion2006         468          50           0         50         50
                                                                      
supterrord~y         452    .4756637    .4999608          0          1
    DemFours         468           4           0          4          4
   DemThrees         468           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         468           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         468           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d         468           4           0          4          4
       often         452     .079646    .2710444          0          1
   sometimes         452    .3960177    .4896101          0          1
      rarley         452    .2345133    .4241637          0          1
  ordpalsymp         429    2.554779    .6800953          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         468           1           0          1          1
    supuswot         452     .199115    .3997772          0          1
educationi~d         468    2.805556    2.068063          0          6
         sex         468    1.508547    .5004619          1          2
         age         468     33.0641    11.86614         18         76
                                                                      
   relincome         400    .1908929    .1691706          0   .9285714
   democracy         468        3.52           0       3.52       3.52
realmosque~t         467    4.753747      1.6145          1          6
   supterror         452    1.265487    .9674773          0          3
     country         468          10           0         10         10
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Nigeria
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Table 10.12 Pakistan 
 
 countryname           0
democracya~d        1233   -1.933544           0  -1.933544  -1.933544
  demessence        1233   -1.594906           0  -1.594906  -1.594906
                                                                      
    internet        1134    .0837743    .2771712          0          1
  fhcivillib        1233           5           0          5          5
civilliberty        1233           5           0          5          5
politicalc~e        1233        4.38           0       4.38       4.38
polpartici~n        1233         .56           0        .56        .56
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g        1233        5.36           0       5.36       5.36
electoralp~s        1233        4.33           0       4.33       4.33
  polity2006        1233          -5           0         -5         -5
     freedom        1233         2.5           0        2.5        2.5
religion2006        1233          96           0         96         96
                                                                      
supterrord~y        1148    .1506969    .3579091          0          1
    DemFours        1233           1           0          1          1
   DemThrees        1233           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos        1233           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes        1233           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d        1233           4           0          4          4
       often        1148    .0714286    .2576516          0          1
   sometimes        1148    .0792683    .2702748          0          1
      rarley        1148    .0905923    .2871536          0          1
  ordpalsymp         979    2.722165    .5830154          1          3
                                                                      
      weight        1233    1.000942    .4443233   .5984424   1.491037
    supuswot        1020    .3519608    .4778161          0          1
educationi~d        1232    2.131494    2.081347          0          7
         sex        1233    1.505272    .5001751          1          2
         age        1187    34.18029    13.72917         18         85
                                                                      
   relincome         968    .2693698    .1669401       .125          1
   democracy        1233        3.92           0       3.92       3.92
realmosque~t        1215    3.869136    2.252985          1          6
   supterror        1148    .4634146    .9146027          0          3
     country        1233          11           0         11         11
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> countryname = Pakistan
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Table 10.13 Spain 
 
democracya~d         402    2.443266           0   2.443266   2.443266
  demessence         402    3.084134           0   3.084134   3.084134
                                                                      
    internet         393    .5496183    .4981661          0          1
  fhcivillib         402           1           0          1          1
civilliberty         402        9.41           0       9.41       9.41
politicalc~e         402        8.75           0       8.75       8.75
polpartici~n         402        6.11           0       6.11       6.11
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         402        7.86           0       7.86       7.86
electoralp~s         402        9.58           0       9.58       9.58
  polity2006         402          10           0         10         10
     freedom         402           7           0          7          7
religion2006         402           2           0          2          2
                                                                      
supterrord~y         381     .175853    .3811957          0          1
    DemFours         402           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees         402           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         402           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         402           1           0          1          1
                                                                      
countrydem~d         402           1           0          1          1
       often         381    .0708661    .2569385          0          1
   sometimes         381    .1049869    .3069396          0          1
      rarley         381    .1102362    .3135958          0          1
  ordpalsymp         386    2.764249    .4768583          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         402    .0094827    .0040355   .0014179   .0196297
    supuswot         379    .1319261    .3388578          0          1
educationi~d         400      3.1875    1.793149          0          6
         sex         402    1.233831    .4237933          1          2
         age         402    32.93035    8.794701         18         68
                                                                      
   relincome         306    .3211951     .133693   .1428571          1
   democracy         402        8.34           0       8.34       8.34
realmosque~t         385    3.911688    1.967839          1          6
   supterror         381    .5328084    .9414992          0          3
     country         402          13           0         13         13
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Spain
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Table 10.14 Turkey 
 
democracya~d        1001    .6402881           0   .6402881   .6402881
  demessence        1001    .1902715           0   .1902715   .1902715
                                                                      
    internet         992    .2066532    .4051088          0          1
  fhcivillib        1001           3           0          3          3
civilliberty        1001        5.59           0       5.59       5.59
politicalc~e        1001        3.75           0       3.75       3.75
polpartici~n        1001        4.44           0       4.44       4.44
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g        1001        6.79           0       6.79       6.79
electoralp~s        1001        7.92           0       7.92       7.92
  polity2006        1001           7           0          7          7
     freedom        1001           5           0          5          5
religion2006        1001          99           0         99         99
                                                                      
supterrord~y         863    .1900348    .3925559          0          1
    DemFours        1001           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees        1001           3           0          3          3
     DemTwos        1001           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes        1001           0           0          0          0
                                                                      
countrydem~d        1001           3           0          3          3
       often         863     .032445    .1772814          0          1
   sometimes         863    .1575898    .3645672          0          1
      rarley         863    .1019699    .3027842          0          1
  ordpalsymp         858    2.677156    .5792727          1          3
                                                                      
      weight        1001           1           0          1          1
    supuswot         912    .1502193    .3574823          0          1
educationi~d        1000       2.679    1.431086          0          6
         sex        1001    1.493506    .5002077          1          2
         age        1001    38.64236    14.70857         18         80
                                                                      
   relincome         913    .2124179    .1588447      .0625          1
   democracy        1001         5.7           0        5.7        5.7
realmosque~t         961    3.416233    1.906542          1          6
   supterror         863    .5144844    .8720784          0          3
     country        1001          14           0         14         14
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> CountryName = Turkey
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Table 10.15 United Kingdom 
 
democracya~d         412    2.361676           0   2.361676   2.361676
  demessence         412    2.820344           0   2.820344   2.820344
                                                                      
    internet         410    .6658537    .4722675          0          1
  fhcivillib         412           1           0          1          1
civilliberty         412        9.12           0       9.12       9.12
politicalc~e         412        8.13           0       8.13       8.13
polpartici~n         412           5           0          5          5
                                                                      
govtfuncti~g         412        8.57           0       8.57       8.57
electoralp~s         412        9.58           0       9.58       9.58
  polity2006         412          10           0         10         10
     freedom         412           7           0          7          7
religion2006         412         2.7           0        2.7        2.7
                                                                      
supterrord~y         387    .1731266    .3788465          0          1
    DemFours         412           0           0          0          0
   DemThrees         412           0           0          0          0
     DemTwos         412           0           0          0          0
     DemOnes         412           1           0          1          1
                                                                      
countrydem~d         412           1           0          1          1
       often         387    .0335917    .1804091          0          1
   sometimes         387    .1395349    .3469524          0          1
      rarley         387    .1033592    .3048215          0          1
  ordpalsymp         372    2.782258     .506994          1          3
                                                                      
      weight         412    .0656796    .0116162    .039662    .104772
    supuswot         372    .1424731    .3500055          0          1
educationi~d         373    4.780161    1.293047          3          7
         sex         412    1.475728    .5000177          1          2
         age         411    32.83698    11.99167         18         81
                                                                      
   relincome         356    .4241573    .2396987   .1666667          1
   democracy         412        8.08           0       8.08       8.08
realmosque~t         406    3.921182    1.986049          1          6
   supterror         387    .4832041    .8557045          0          3
     country         412           1           0          1          1
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> countryname = UK
 
